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 Future historians are most likely to regard the emergence of justice and home affairs 
as a major policy-making area of the European Union (EU) as one of the most significant 
developments in the European integration process in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 
21st century. This may at first sight look like a slightly exaggerated statement, but it is 
validated by the following three considerations: 
 
First, justice and home affairs touch upon essential functions and prerogatives of the modern 
nation-state. Providing citizens with internal security, controlling external borders and access 
to national territory and administering justice have since the gradual emergence of the 
modern nation-state in the17th/18th century and its theoretical underpinning in the writings of 
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau all belonged to basic justification 
and legitimacy of the existence of the state. The fact  that since the Treaty of Maastricht 
(1993) the EU has developed a steadily increasing role in this domain means that it has 
entered into one of the last domains of exclusive national competence, not by replacing the 
state as a provider of  internal security and justice as essential public goods, but by emerging 
as a more and more important additional provider. 
 
Second, justice and home affairs touch upon a number of very sensitive political issues. The 
fight against crime and illegal immigration, ensuring that asylum systems are both fair and 
protected against abuse and facilitating access to justice are issues which matter for 
European citizens. This is reflected in the importance which internal security issues have 
acquired in national elections campaigns – the last French general elections can be taken as 
one example among many -, but also in opinion polls which indicate that internal security 
related issues rank very high in European citizens concerns. The latest Eurobarometer 
opinion poll indicates, for instance, that 80% of EU citizens count terrorism amongst their 
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primary fears and 71% of them organised crime. 90% of them think that the fight against 
terrorism should be one of the priorities of the Union, 88% think the same about the fight 
against organised crime and drug trafficking and 81% about the fight against illegal 
immigration.1 This means that by developing its role in this domain the EU is responding to 
some fundamental concerns (and expectations) of citizens which are more pronounced than 
in many other policy-making areas of the EU, including the Common Foreign and Security 
policy. 
 
Third, under the label of the “area of freedom, security and justice” (AFSR) justice and home 
affairs co-operation within the EU has by now not only become a fundamental integration and 
treaty objective2 but also one of the major areas of “growth” of EU action. During the last 
three years the Council has adopted each year around hundred texts in this field, most of 
which have been legally binding, a range of new structures have been created with Europol 
and Eurojust being only the most prominent ones, in the context of the JHA Council ministers 
of interior and justice are now normally meeting on a monthly basis (which makes the JHA 
Council one of the most frequently meeting Council formations) and already on two 
occasions (Tampere in October 1999 and Seville in June 2002) the Heads of State or 
Government of the Union have dedicated European Council meetings almost exclusively to 
JHA issues. The EU acquis is justice and home affairs is among the fastest growing areas of 
legal action, and – although progress is sometimes slow – the EU’s agenda in the JHA 
domain is now wide-ranging and ambitious to an extent which would have been difficult to 
imagine still at the beginning of the 1990s. 
 
Having regard to the importance gained by JHA co-operation as a policy-making area of the 
EU the European Convention, entrusted with the drawing up of a draft constitutional treaty for 
the EU, obviously had to give considerable room to this domain in its work. And it did so: Its 
Presidium defined a specific set of questions and challenges in the JHA domain,3 a special 
Working Group (“X”) then looked at reform needs and made a range of substantial 
proposals,4 there were several major initiatives on far-reaching initiatives (such as the 
ambitious Fischer/de Villepin proposals of November 2002)5 and, finally, numerous changes 
and new elements regarding the AFSR were introduced in the final draft of the constitution 
adopted by the Convention in July 2003.6  
                                                 
1  Standard Eurobaromter 59, July 2003, pp. 9 and 58-59. 
2  Formally codified in Article 2 of the Treaty establishing the European Union of equal legal status as, 
for instance, Economic and Monetary Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy as 
fundamental Union objectives.  
3 CONV 69/02 and 206/02. 
4 Final Report: CONV 426/02. 
5 CONV 435/02. 
6 CONV 850/03. 
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Having regard to the prominence given to the JHA domain in the work of the 
Convention it seems worthwhile to ask to what extent the results, i.e. the provisions of the 
draft constitution, are creating a new framework for this domain if adopted by the 2003/2004 
IGC. This question is an all the more pertinent one to ask as the Treaty of Amsterdam, which 
entered into force in 1999, had already brought very extensive reforms together with a long 
list of objectives which are still far from being fully implemented. Inevitably one has to 
combine the question about the new framework with the question of the “value added” the 
new reforms, following so rapidly after the Amsterdam reforms, will bring. 
 
 
THE NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 The by far most fundamental change the draft constitution brings for JHA co-
operation is the recasting of its overall legal framework. The existing division between the 
EU’s three “pillars” is replaced by a single legal framework in a single legal text. This step will 
remove the existing split in the JHA domain between, on the one hand, asylum, immigration, 
border controls and judicial co-operation in civil matters falling under Title IV of the EC Treaty 
(“first pillar”) and, on the other hand, judicial co-operation in criminal matters and police co-
operation falling under Title VI of the EU Treaty (“third pillar”).  The formal abolition of the 
“pillar” division will put an end to the need to adopt “parallel” legislative acts under the 
different “pillars” in certain domains of “cross-pillar” implications (such as money laundering), 
will reduce the potential for controversies over the appropriate legal basis, will put an end to 
the artificial separation of decision-making structures between “first” and “third pillar” matters 
in the Council and will facilitate the negotiation and conclusion of agreements with third 
countries on “cross-pillar” matters. The new single legal framework also means that the 
Union will be able to act internally and externally7 as single legal actor with a single set of 
legal instruments – not the current division between “first” and “third pillar” instruments – 
which will be an important contribution to a more coherent and clear-cut legal acquis. 
Combined with this is the abolition of most of the restrictions and distinctions between the 
role of the European Court of Justice in the JHA domain under the two pillars (see below). 
 Yet the major progress made with the abolition of the “pillar” structure is partially 
undermined by a number of special provisions for the individual JHA policy areas: According 
to Article III-165 the European Commission will have an exclusive right of initiative for 
asylum, immigration, border control and judicial co-operation in civil matters, but will have to 
share the right of initiative with the Member States in police and judicial co-operation in 
criminal matters. Whereas in the aforementioned areas (asylum etc.) the draft constitution 
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provides with one small exception (family law) for qualified majority voting, substantial parts 
of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters will still be governed by the existing 
unanimity requirement. A similar distinction applies to the role of the European Parliament 
which is granted co-decision on most of the issues of the first named areas, but is limited to 
assent or consultation procedures on quite a number of last named ones. All this means that 
from an institutional and procedural point of view the old “pillar division” will at least to some 
extent continue to exist. This “hidden” continuation of the pillar separation could lead to 
problems in the adoption of cross-cutting packages of measures because of different 
procedures, majority requirements and forms of involvement of the Parliament. It also 
significantly reduces the transparency of the JHA provisions and – of course – runs against 
the principle of a single legal framework.  
 A further weakness of the new single legal framework is the absence of any clearer 
definition of the objectives of the AFSR as a fundamental treaty and integration objective. As 
fundamental public goods “freedom”, “security” and “justice” are so extremely broad 
objectives that a somewhat more precise definition of the AFSJ’s objectives – as this is done, 
for instance, for the Common Foreign and Security Policy in Article I–39 - would have been 
highly appropriate. Instead Article I-3(2) dealing with the AFSJ contains only a reference to 
an EU “without internal frontiers” and establishes a link between the AFSJ and the single 
market with its “free and undistorted” competition. This seems rather misleading and 
unfortunate as the AFSJ as a political project has since long far outgrown the Schengen 
objective of allowing for the abolition of internal border controls and as its links with the 
economic aims of the single market are of a rather peripheral nature. The language used 
here seems to fall back in the 1980s, which is rather astonishing for a Convention on the 
“future of the European Union”. The “specific provisions” on the AFSJ in Article I-41 only 
contain some general guidelines for its construction (trust building etc.) and add little to a 
clarification of its concept and basic aims. It seems particularly regrettable that the occasion 
has been missed to spell out the need for a balanced development of the AFSJ with equal 
consideration given to all three of the public goods. So far around 80% of the measures 
adopted have been directly or indirectly linked to internal security – and correspondingly few 
to “freedom” and “justice”. 
 
 
THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS PART OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
 
 In a wider sense part of the new legal framework of JHA co-operation is also the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights which is fully incorporated in part II of the draft constitution. 
                                                                                                                                                        
7 By virtue of Article I-6 the Union is vested with full legal personality which removes current 
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There can be no doubt that measures in the JHA domain can affect fundamental rights of 
individuals in a much more direct way than, for instance, most of the single market 
measures. With the full incorporation of the Charter the draft constitution clearly creates a 
better basis for comprehensive fundamental rights protection at EU level – and not only 
through national constitutional law and international legal instruments (such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights). Although it is true that the protection of certain fundamental 
rights – such as non-discrimination – can already be regarded as adequately ensured in the 
current EC legal order, there are still a number of gaps of relevance for JHA measures which 
will be filled through the incorporation of the Charter.  This applies, in particular, to the right to 
the protection of personal data (Article II-8) which – having regard to the proliferation of data-
bases and exchange systems in the context of the AFSJ (SIS, Europol, Eurodac, etc.) and 
the rapidly developing co-operation with third countries (example: the Europol-USA 
agreement of December 2002 which provides for the exchange of personal data) – is of 
increasing importance.  
The incorporation of the Charter is also not without importance for the development of 
external relations in the JHA domain. The right to life and the prohibition of the death penalty 
(Article II-2) as well as the right to the integrity of the person (Article II-3) and the prohibition 
of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article II-4) could clarify and 
help to strengthen the Union’s position in negotiations with third countries on legal assistance 
and extradition agreements. It should be recalled here that the problem of the death penalty 
was one of the most difficult issues in the negotiations on the EU-US extradition agreement 
signed on 25 June 2003.8  
It is worth a special mentioning that the preamble of the Charter contains a special 
reference to the AFSJ as one of the elements through which the Union places man “at the 
heart of its activities”.  While this sounds nice a general affirmation of goodwill, one would 
have wished a slightly stronger reference to the fact that JHA co-operation in the context of 
the AFSJ can actually (and should) make a contribution to the effective protection of the 
Charter rights within the EU. It should also be noted that the draft constitution does not 
provide for a right of individuals to bring direct actions before the Court of Justice on 
fundamental rights issues. As a result fundamental rights protection by the Court will  
normally be exercised via the preliminary rulings procedure, arising from cases brought 





                                                                                                                                                        
uncertainties on this issue. 
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THE REVISED POLICY-MAKING OBJECTIVES 
 
 The first thing to note as regards the policy-making objectives for JHA co-operation is 
that the draft constitution maintains the Treaty of Amsterdam approach of providing detailed 
lists of individual objectives for each of the main policy-making areas which almost read like 
legislative programmes. This has to be regretted. First of all it is most unusual for 
constitutional texts to include such detailed programmatic elements which can quickly 
become outdated and drastically reduce the transparency of the text. Then there is also the 
disadvantage that these lists of objectives can be interpreted as excluding everything from 
EU action which is not explicitly mentioned. This is all the more of relevance as the draft 
constitution reinforces the principle of conferral by explicitly stating that all competences not 
(explicitly) conferred upon the Union remain with the Member States (Article I-9(2). 
 The policy-making objectives currently contained in Title IV TEC and Title VI TEU are 
both amended and added to by the draft constitution. Only the more important changes can 
be mentioned here: 
 
Policies on border checks, asylum and immigration 
 
As regards border controls the draft constitution now provides for a “policy” rather 
than the current “measures” only. This seems to imply a higher degree of integration, 
although the term “common policy” – not very popular in some capitals – has been avoided. 
The most significant innovation is the gradual establishment of an “integrated management 
system for external borders” (Article III-166(1)(c) and (2)(d). This reflects the Member States 
recent move towards a much more intensified co-operation on external border issues which – 
driven also by the challenges of enlargement – has already come out very clearly in the 
Council plan for the management of external borders9 and the Seville European Council 
conclusions (both June 2002). The project of a Common European Border Guard/Police – 
which had some support also inside of the Convention – has not found its way into the draft, 
but the term “integrated management” is wide enough not to exclude it in a more distant 
future.  
 As regards asylum the draft constitution introduces for the first time the traditionally 
highly charged term “common policy” (Article III-167(1). Yet the use of this term is less 
revolutionary than it might seem since the asylum policy objectives set by the European 
Council of Tampere in October 1999 were already so ambitious that the term could have 
been used ever since if some Member States would not have preferred the less charged 
term “common asylum system”. Nevertheless the formal introduction of a “common policy” 
                                                                                                                                                        
8  Council document no. 9153/03. 
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reinforces the common ambition in this area, which is indeed added to by a number of 
additional objectives. This applies, in particular, to the introduction of a “uniform status of 
asylum” (Article 167(2)(a), a “uniform status of subsidiary protection” (Article 167(2)(b), 
common procedures for the granting and withdrawing of the asylum or subsidiary protection 
status (Article 167(2)d) and “partnership and co-operation” with third countries for the 
purpose of managing inflows of people applying for either status (Article 167(2)(g). Although 
some elements of these objectives are already to be found in current Article 63 TEC, the 
foreseen common uniform status goes clearly beyond the more fragmentary current treaty 
provisions which were largely based on a common minimum standards approach only. The 
explicit empowering of the Union to take action in relations with third countries seems a 
useful and even necessary complement to the substantial internal objectives in this field. 
 More surprising than in the area of asylum policy is the use of the term “common 
policy” in the area of immigration policy where the draft constitution seems to expect the 
Union to deliver on issues on which many Member States have so far largely failed to deliver 
effective policy responses: “efficient management of migration flows”, “fair treatment” of 
legally resident third country nationals, “prevent” and enhanced combating of illegal 
immigration and trafficking in human beings (Article III-168(1). These very ambitious 
objectives are unfortunately not matched by correspondingly comprehensive powers of the 
Union. New are only provisions on measures against illegal immigration, unauthorised 
residence, trafficking in persons (Article III-168(2)(c) and (d) as well as the conclusion of 
readmission agreements with third countries (Article III-168(3), all areas, however, in which 
the Union has already become active. Provision is also made, it is true, for measures 
promoting the integration of third-country nationals, but these have to exclude any 
harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States (Article III-168(4). It seems 
rather doubtful whether much of a “common policy” on the crucial issue of integration can 
emerge on that basis.  
The most significant restriction on a “common immigration policy”, however, is 
imposed by Article III-168(5) which provides that Member States will fully keep their right to 
determine “volumes of admission” of third-country nationals for work purposes, whether 
employed or self-employed. With this provision one of the most crucial aspect of any policy 
on legal immigration – the decision on numbers - is taken out of the sphere of potential EU 
action. This will clearly not help with the development of common approach on opening up 
more channels for legal immigration, which the Commission had already advocated in 2000 
because of the dramatic demographic change within the EU. It could well mean that the 
“common immigration policy” of the EU might remain – as it currently is - largely a policy on 
illegal immigration. One has to ask oneself, however, whether in a Union of 25 Member 
                                                                                                                                                        
9  Council document no. 10019/02. 
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States with major differences between the historical, cultural and socio-economic context of 
national immigration policies and, indeed, very different immigration pressures a fully fledged 
“common policy” including legal immigration is indeed feasible. Yet in any case, having 
regard to the applying limitations, the use of the term “common policy” in the draft 
constitution in relation to immigration policy matters seems hardly justifiable.  
 
Judicial co-operation in civil matters 
 
In this domain the current catalogue of aims in Article 65 TEC is added to by the 
objectives of a “high level of access to justice”, the development of alternative methods of 
dispute settlement and support for the training of the judiciary and judicial staff (Article III-
170(2)(e), (g) and (h). As the Union has already become active in all of these areas this 
represents largely a codification of existing practice, although it clearly creates a clearer 
basis for future action. Important is that by virtue of Article III-170(1) co-operation in civil 
matters is to be based on the principle of mutual recognition, but “may” also include 
measures of approximation if national laws which introduces a harmonisation dimension .  
 
Judicial co-operation in criminal matters  
 
In this area the draft constitution increases the number of objectives from currently 
four (Article 31 TEU) to twelve, a number which would be even higher if one would include 
the tasks defined for Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. New is, in 
particular, the possibility to adopt framework laws on minimum rules regarding the mutual 
admissibility of evidence, the rights of individuals in criminal procedure, the rights of victims 
of crime and other “specific aspects” of criminal procedure (Article III-171(2), the 
considerably increased list (which can be added to further) of the areas of “particularly 
serious crime” for which minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and 
sanctions can be established (Article III-172(1), an authorisation for EU action in the field of 
crime prevention (Article III-173) and the possibility of the establishment of a European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office (Article III-175). All these are innovative elements, but they also 
raise a number of questions:  
While one may welcome the inclusion for the first time of criminal procedure in the 
treaty defined domain of co-operation as a necessary addition, this could also expose more 
the tension between the civil law and common law systems in the Union. Rather than 
establishing a rather incomplete list for potential EU action it may also have been more 
appropriate to open the whole are of criminal procedure for co-operation, subject to a 
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unanimity requirement to adequately protect the interests of Member States with 
fundamentally different legal traditions. 
The extension of the list of forms of  “serious crime” eligible for EU legislative action 
has to be seen as a step forward, especially as regards cross-border crimes of rapidly 
increasing importance, such as trafficking in human beings and computer crime. One can, of 
course, question the approach of listing individual crimes as this will require a cumbersome 
separate decision-making process if other forms of crime would need to be added at a later 
stage.  
There can be no doubt that EU action in the field of crime prevention (on best practice 
identification and training, for instance) can add a useful additional dimension to EU 
measures in the fight against cross-border crime. Yet  the scope of this action is limited by 
the exclusion of any approximation of national legislative and regulatory provisions (Article 
III-173). 
The provision on the possible – not mandatory - establishment of a European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office is one of the most controversial ones in the draft constitution and could 
still become one of the victims of the Intergovernmental Conference. While a reasonable 
case can be made for enabling such a European “prosecution service” for the investigation, 
prosecuting and bringing to justice of offences against the Union’s financial interests – 
especially if the prosecutors would still operate under national law before the national courts 
– the inclusion in the Office’s scope of “serious crimes affecting more than one Member 
State” seems very broad (and daring) indeed. From a political point of view the resistance 
against such an Office in some Member States could probably be reduced significantly if  the 
scope of its function would – at least as long as there are still very fundamental difference 
between national criminal law systems – be limited to the protection of the Union’s financial 
interests.  
As regards Eurojust Article III-174 largely codifies existing functions, this, however 
with the exception of Eurojust being enabled to also “initiate” criminal prosecutions 
conducted by national authorities. In this form this is currently not provided for by the 
Eurojust Decision10, but could indeed help with making the best possible use of the 




 The draft constitution streamlines and simplifies current provisions on general police 
co-operation while leaving their substance largely unchanged (Article III-176) – one of the 
few instances in which the Convention has actually succeeded in simplifying provisions, 
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which was part of its original mandate. As regards Europol (Article III-177) there are some 
clearly innovative elements. According to Article III-177(2)(b) Europol can not only be vested 
with co-ordinating functions but also have as tasks the “organisation and implementation” of 
investigative and operational action carried out jointly with national authorities. At first sight 
this may appear like a significant step forward in the direction of an “operational” role of 
Europol. This remains controversial in several Member States, and in many cases 
substantial changes to national legislation would indeed need to be introduced to enable 
Europol officers to take an active role in implementing policing measures. Yet Article III-
177(3) severely restricts what would appear as a stronger operational role of Europol by 
reserving “coercive measures” exclusively to national authorities and by providing that any 
operational action by Europol must be carried out “in liaison and in agreement with” national 
authorities. One can detect a slight tension here between an attempt, on the one hand, to 
strengthen Europol’s role, and, on the other hand, to remove grounds for fundamental 
objections from the Member States. The underlying idea seems to be to make a distinction 
between powers of investigation – which Europol should to some extent be vested with – and 
operational law enforcement measures – which should remain with national authorities. This, 
however, should have been made much more clear in the relevant provisions which are of a 
rather tortuous wording. Interestingly the Convention seems to have been willing to go much 
further with operational powers on the prosecution side – as the provisions on the European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office show – than on the policing side, an asymmetry which is clearly 
not in the interest of effective co-operation between European police and prosecution 
authorities.   
 A further new element is the provision for a European law or framework law on the 
conditions and limitations under which national law enforcement authorities may operate in 
the territory of another Member State (Article III-178). This has been a notoriously difficult 
issue for several decades with major differences persisting between national legislation 
which – in many Member States – continues to impose very tight restrictions on even only 
the movements of police officers from other Member States within the national territory. Not 
surprisingly unanimity is provided for this sensitive issue – which may delay adoption of 
common legislation for many years to come. 
 
 
DIVISION OF POWERS AND SUBSIDIARITY 
 
 According to Article I-13(2) of the draft constitution the AFSJ is a domain of “shared 
competence”, i.e. a domain, in which the Member States shall exercise their competence 
                                                                                                                                                        
10 Article 6 of the Eurojust Decision is much more vague in this respect (Official Journal of the 
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only to the extent that the Union has not exercised, or has decided to cease exercising, its 
competence. This means to some extent a strengthening of EU competence as Union action 
in the JHA domain will automatically generate a pre-emptive effect on further national 
measures in this domain, which is currently far from clear, at least in the area of the “third 
pillar”. As a result of this pre-emptive effect Member States could well find it more difficult to 
take national action on a given issue, such as, for instance, illegal immigration, even if the 
Union has only taken partial action.  
There is a furthers element of strengthening the Union side of the division of powers 
between the EU and its Member States. The strong emphasis placed in Article I-9(1) and (2) 
on the principle of conferred competences would seem to provide a heightened barrier to a 
gradual extension of “shared” EU powers. Yet  the “flexibility clause” of Article I-17(1)11 allows 
EU action beyond explicitly mentioned powers if such action “should prove necessary (…) to 
attain one of the objectives set by the constitution”. As pointed out the AFSJ is indeed one of 
these fundamental “objectives” listed in Article I-3, but lacks any more precise definition as 
regards its content and scope. At least in principle this could offer the EU quite a wide margin 
to manoeuvre for extending its scope of action in the JHA domain.  
Apart from the principle of conferred competences, however, the draft constitution 
contains at least two other elements which are likely to support a restrictive interpretation of 
Union powers in the AFSJ domain. One of those is the revised subsidiarity principle of Article 
I-9(3) which now provides that the Union shall act in domains outside of exclusive Union 
competence only “if and insofar as the objectives of the intended action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, either at central or at regional and local level”. Apart from 
generally increasing the burden of proof for EU action also in the JHA domain, the EU 
institutions will now also have to take into account the regional level which – especially in the 
case of the German Länder can have quite substantial powers to act on a number of JHA 
issues. It should also be mentioned that Article III-160 specifically mentions the role of 
national parliaments in ensuring compliance of legislative initiatives in the areas of police and 
judicial co-operation in criminal matters with the principle of solidarity in accordance with the 
“early warning” procedure provided for by Protocol on the application of the principles of 
solidarity and proportionality. Although this controlling role of national parliaments applies in 
principle to all legislative initiatives the specific mentioning of it in respect of these areas of 
JHA co-operation could increase the pressure of justification for new measures. 
The second element which could contribute to a restrictive interpretation of Union 
powers is the new principle of the “respect” of “essential State functions” introduced by 
Article I-5(1) of the draft constitution. These functions explicitly include “maintaining law and 
order” and “safeguarding internal security”.  Article III-163 takes this principle again up by 
                                                                                                                                                        
European Communities, No. L 61 of 6.3.2002). 
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providing that the JHA provisions shall not affect the exercise of national responsibilities with 
regard to maintaining law and order and safeguarding internal security. As most of the areas 
covered by the AFSJ are directly or indirectly linked to public order and internal security 
issues these articles could provide substantial arguments for Member States opposing an 
extension of EU action in certain fields of the JHA domain. 
On the whole the picture regarding the division of powers is therefore a rather mixed 
one, with the draft constitution providing both some potential for strengthening the Union side 
of the division of powers scale, and new grounds for the Member States to restrict Union 




SOLIDARITY AS A NEW INTEGRATION PRINCIPLE 
 
 The introduction of an explicit principle of solidarity into the context of JHA co-
operation is one of the most significant innovations of the draft constitution. If one takes the 
idea of the AFSJ as a single “area” in which Member States want to find common responses 
to common challenges seriously then it would seem only logical that Member States are also 
solidary with each as regards the burden of these common responses. A particularly obvious 
example for the need of solidarity is the protection of the EU’s external borders where 
Member States face rather different challenges and problems because of their different 
geographical positions, the result being that some face a significantly higher “bill” for 
ensuring the high common standards of external border security agreed at the EU level. the 
question of solidarity is all the more important in view of the accession of ten new Member 
States in 2004, some of which still have major capability deficits in terms of implementing 
external the EU(-Schengen) external border security standards.  
 The draft constitution introduces the principle of solidarity no less than four times 
regarding areas of relevance to JHA co-operation. These are the framing of a common policy 
on asylum, immigration and external border controls (Article III-158(2), the adoption of 
provisional measures for the benefit of Member States experiencing an emergency situation 
caused by a sudden inflow of third-country nationals (Article III-167(3), the validity of the 
“principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, 
between the Member States” for the whole of Section 2 of Chapter IV (policies on border 
checks, asylum and immigration, Article III-169) and – outside of the provisions on the AFSJ 
– the general solidarity clause of Article I-42 on the mobilisation of all instruments at the 
Union’s disposal to prevent terrorist threats, to protect democratic institutions and the civilian 
                                                                                                                                                        
11 A continuation of the current general enabling clause of Article 308 TEC. 
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population and to assist a Member State in the vent of an attack. Although different 
meanings can obviously be given to the term “solidarity”, the formal introduction of the 
principle nevertheless mark a substantial step forward towards a system of common support 
for common tasks and effective burden-sharing – with the significant inclusion of the use of 
EU budgetary means. One can regret, however, that the solidarity principle has not simply 
been extended to all domains of the AFSJ as needs for solidarity can also emerge in other 
fields such as, for instance, the fight against organised crime where at least some of the new 
Member States still lack sophisticated investigation equipment. 
 
 
THE REFORMS OF THE DECISION-MAKING SYSTEM 
 
 Much attention was given before and during the work of the Convention to the deficits 
of the decision-making system regarding the AFSJ, and in particular to issue of the persisting 
unanimity requirement as one of the reasons for lack of sufficient progress in a number of 
areas. The draft constitution provides indeed for a number of substantial reforms on the 
decision-making side: 
 As regards voting requirements the draft constitution brings a major breakthrough 
towards qualified majority voting. Co-decision by the European Parliament with majority 
voting in the Council becomes the standard decision-making procedure also for the domain 
of JHA co-operation. There are a number of exceptions. Unanimity will still apply to 
measures concerning family law with cross-border implications (Article III-170(3), the 
establishment of minimum rules concerning “other” (i.e. not explicitly mentioned) aspects of 
criminal procedure (Article III-171(2)(d), the identification of  “other” (i.e. not already explicitly 
mentioned) areas of serious crime for which minimum rules concerning the definition of 
criminal offences may be introduced (Article III-172(2), the European law on the 
establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (Article III-175(1), legislative 
measures regarding operational co-operation between national law enforcement authorities 
(Article III-176(3) and the laying down of the conditions and limitations under which national 
law enforcement authorities may operate in the territory of another Member State (Article III-
178). While all these are clearly important and sensitive areas, these exclusions from 
majority voting should not conceal the fact that the draft constitution introduces majority 
voting on a very broad scale indeed, and this in areas such as criminal justice co-operation 
which were at the last IGC (2000) still far from being considered as eligible for majority 
voting. 
 While this extension of majority voting may be regarded as a significant change, it 
also raises certain questions. On the one hand there can be no doubt that more majority 
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voting on JHA matters will increase the Union’s decision-making capacity on the further 
development of the AFSJ. The last few years have amply demonstrated – especially in the 
domain of asylum and immigration – that unanimity means all too often blocked or major 
delays, and even where decisions are taken agreements on the least common denominator. 
In view of the upcoming major enlargement (and likely further rounds of enlargement) the 
advantage of increasing decision-making capacity through majority voting carries 
considerable weight.  
One the other hand, however, this comes at a price which at least some Member 
States might increasingly feel as heavy. The draft constitution provides for majority voting in 
areas where Union measures can cut deeply into national legal systems and traditions as 
well as national concepts of law and order. Examples are the establishment of rules and 
procedures to ensure the recognition “throughout of the Union” of “all forms” of judgements 
and judicial decisions (Article III-171(1)(a), the establishment of minimum rules concerning 
the definition of criminal offences in areas of serious crime (Article III-172) and the rules 
regarding the functions and the scope of action of the European law enforcement agencies 
Europol and Eurojust (Articles III-174 and III-177). It should be mentioned that measures 
regarding the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of “relevant information” 
– and area of particular sensitivity to citizens - are also subject to majority voting. It seems 
quite a legitimate question to ask to what extent the advantage of an increased decision-
making capacity outweighs the cost of some Member States potentially being forced to 
introduce substantial changes which could run “against the grain” of their national legal 
systems as a result of being outvoted in the Council. Differences between national legal 
systems and concepts of public order  are at least in some areas - the different approaches 
to violent demonstrators or drug addicts are only two examples among many – so 
considerable that the “costs of adaptation” for outvoted Member States could be very high 
indeed. This applies particularly to police and judicial co-operation criminal matters. Yet 
because of the still very different situations and challenges in the field of immigration one 
may also wonder whether passing to majority voting on conditions of entry and residence 
and the rights of legally resident third country nationals (Article III-168(2)(a) and (b) is fully 
justified.12 
 Another aspect of the decision-making system to which the draft constitution 
introduces changes is the right of initiative. While the European Commission is vested with 
an exclusive right of initiative for border checks, asylum, immigration and judicial co-
operation in civil matters, the draft provides that it has to share its right of initiative in the 
areas of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters with the Member States (Article 
III-165). Those, however, can only introduce initiatives with at least one quarter of their total 
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number (i.e. after the 2004 enlargement seven). This provision would seem to be a good 
compromise between, on the one hand, the preservation of a right of initiative of the Member 
States (which have introduced a number of useful proposals during the last few years) and, 
on the other, the need to prevent a proliferation of initiatives from individual Member States 
which are all too often inspired by purely national interests. The one quarter requirement 
could lead to a healthy “concentration” of national initiatives.  
 Of importance for the Union’s decision-making capacity in the context of the AFSJ is 
also the structure of the Council. The introduction of the “Legislative and General Affairs 
Council” who – when acting in a legislative capacity – “shall include one or two 
representatives at ministerial level with relevant expertise” (Article I-23(1) would in principle 
allow to have all relevant JHA decisions being taken in this Council formation. Because of the 
large number and the specificity of issues on the JHA Council’s agenda during the last few 
years, however, it could well turn out to be more practical to include the JHA Council among 
the “further formations” in which the Council, by decision of the European Council, can meet 
(Article I-23(3). The senior “Article 36 Committee” which currently co-ordinates Council work 
in the context of the “third pillar” is not any longer provided for in the draft constitution which 
will leave legislative co-ordination responsibility solely with the COREPER. Yet Article III-162 
provides for the establishment of a standing Council committee in charge of promoting and 
strengthening operational co-operation on internal security. As operational co-operation 
between national authorities is crucial for the effective implementation of EU policies in the 
JHA domain but in its nature very different from the legislative process it certainly makes 
sense to establish a separate co-ordinating committee for this task, provided that the 
COREPER – as the supreme decision preparing body below the ministerial level – can still 
ensure overall coherence and consistency. One may only ask whether it is actually 





 The effective and comprehensive implementation of decisions is of particular 
importance in the JHA domain: Doubts about effective implementation of certain measures in 
other Member States can increase security risks and therefore make Member States more 
reluctant to engage in common measures. It can drastically reduce trust between national 
law enforcement and judicial authorities which is crucial to effective cross-border co-
operation. It therefore seems very sensible – though again not absolutely necessary in a 
“constitution” – that the draft provides for adoption of arrangements for the “objective and 
                                                                                                                                                        
12 However, already under current treaty provisions (Article 63 TEC) some of these aspects would 
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impartial evaluation” of the implementation of Union policies in the AFSJ context (Article III-
161). The model for this provision have clearly been current “collective evaluation” 
procedures which – especially in the Schengen context – have led to some positive results. 
Such “peer review” monitoring of implementation complements the much harder and more 
inflexible formal treaty infringement proceedings before the Court (Articles III-265 and 267). 
 
 
DEMOCRATIC AND JUDICIAL CONTROL 
 
 As a domain which in many cases touches directly citizens interests and rights 
effective democratic and judicial control is of obvious “constitutional” importance to JHA co-
operation. The draft constitution considerably strengthens the role of the European 
Parliament which gains co-decision or – in the case of harmonisation measures in the field of 
criminal law (Article III-171(1) and the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office (Article III-175) – at least “consent” powers in most of the fields covered by the AFSJ. 
Only in very few fields will the Parliament according to the draft constitution still be limited to 
its current purely consultative role: administrative co-operation between Member States 
(Article III-164), measures in favour of Member States facing an emergency situation 
because of a sudden inflow of third country nationals (Article III-167(3), measures concerning 
family law (Article III-170(3), operational co-operation between national law enforcement 
authorities (Article III-176(3) and the definition of the conditions under which national 
authorities may operate in the territory of another member State (Article III-178). While one 
can see a certain logic in limiting the EP’s role under provisions such as Articles III-164, 
176(3) and 178 which concern largely the role of national authorities, this is much less 
evident in the case of measures in the civil law domain – which can affect all EU citizens – 
and in the case of “solidarity” measures in favour of Member States facing a mass influx of 
third country nationals – as this might involve substantial EU budgetary funds. Nevertheless 
the draft constitution brings a clear breakthrough for democratic control at the European level 
as the EP becomes in fact a real co-legislator for the further construction of the AFSJ. This 
breakthrough is further enhanced through explicit information rights of the EP regarding the 
evaluation of implementation of Union policies (Article III-161) and the proceedings of the 
standing committee on operational co-operation (Article III-162) as well as its involvement in 
the evaluation of the activities of Eurojust (Article III-174(2) and Europol (Article III-178). 
 A slight question has to be raised, however, over the EP’s capacity to fully cope with 
all these increased powers. Already under the current “light” consultation procedure the 
Parliament had sometimes to struggle to keep pace with the occasionally massive legislative 
                                                                                                                                                        
have come under majority voting by 2004.  
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agenda of the JHA Council. One should also note that the EP will have no role in the 
definition of the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning  within the AFSJ 
by the European Council (Article III-159), and that no provision has been made for giving the 
Parliament a greater say on the multi-annual action plans of the Council which – although 
non-legislative in nature – have done much to shape the AFSJ during the last few years.  
 The position of national parliaments is also significantly strengthened by Article III-
160(1) which not only gives them a particular responsibility on ensuring EU compliance with 
the subsidiarity principle in police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters but also grants 
them the same rights of participation the European Parliament has regarding the evaluation 
of the implementation of Union policies, the proceedings of the standing committee on 
operational co-operation and the evaluation of the activities of Eurojust and Europol. Making 
full use of these new possibilities of scrutiny will require quite substantial reorganisation in 
some national parliaments not all of which have currently effective monitoring procedures for 
EU JHA measures in place.  
 Regarding judicial control its has already been pointed out above that as part of the 
formal abolition of the pillar structure most of the remaining “pillar specific” restrictions on the 
role of the Court of Justice, which is called “High Court” in the draft, have been removed. 
There is only one exception: According to Article III-283 the High Court’s jurisdiction will not 
extend to operations carried out by the police or other national law enforcement services and 
to measures under national law regarding the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security. This restriction is in line with the principle of the “respect” of 
“essential State functions” in maintaining law and order and safeguarding internal security in 
Article I-5(1) and should not unduly restrict the High Court’s power of judicial review of Union 
measures. The removal of all other restrictions has to be welcomed as a significant – and 
overdue – step towards comprehensive judicial control and protection within the AFSJ. Yet 
the burden of cases arising from JHA issues could significantly increase in the future which 
may make it necessary to make use of the possibility opened by Article III-264 to establish 
one or more specialised courts of first instance attached to the High Court for certain classes 
of action or proceedings brought in specific cases. Asylum and immigration as well as the 
areas of civil law and criminal co-operation would be the most obvious areas for considering 





 The reforms of the draft constitution are substantial enough to regard them as 
creating indeed a “new framework” for JHA co-operation within the EU. The most significant 
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elements in this respect are the formal abolition of the three “pillars”, the incorporation of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, the extension of the policy-making objectives, the 
introduction of solidarity as an integration principle and the breakthroughs on majority voting 
and parliamentary participation. Taken together these elements constitute a strong potential 
for the further development of the AFSJ as a major political project of the EU, both in terms 
of substantial progress with JHA policies and more guarantees for citizens in terms of 
protection of their rights and democratic control.  
 Yet this draft constitution also its flaws. Perhaps these were inevitable in a 
Convention which was permanently torn between the ambition of serving as a pioneer for a 
stronger and truly “constitutionalized” Union on the one hand and the desire to arrive at a 
draft which would as far as possible satisfy all of the national governments so that it would 
have a chance to pass the 2003/2004 IGC largely intact. In any case the flaws are there, and 
they are not of a minor nature: 
 First, the “area of freedom, security and justice” remains very much an empty shell in 
terms of a declared fundamental political objectives. A jungle of individual policy-making 
objective does not replace a strategic vision of what the AFSJ is all about. Is it essentially an 
internal security project? Is it much more than that? Is it ultimately only a general enabling 
objective to allow ministries of interior and justice to co-operate on whatever and whenever 
they want?  This draft constitution does not provide an answer to these questions and, 
worse, does not contain a vision what this major integration project should ultimately 
become. 
 Second, this draft constitution – perhaps because of the lack of an underlying 
common vision – is seriously unbalanced. One the one hand it is in some areas daring to the 
point that one can seriously question whether so much “progress” is actually justifiable at this 
stage of the integration process because of the likely consequences for still highly different 
national legal and public order systems. The broad remit for the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office and majority voting on harmonisation measures in the criminal justice 
area are key examples in this respect. On the other hand, however, there are plenty of 
examples where the draft is extremely conservative, allowing for hardly any new 
development potential. Decision-making  rules on family law and the provisions on Europol 
are key examples for that. All this is a recipe for ample controversies, an uneven 
development of AFSJ and confusion over its final objectives. 
 Third, in far too many instances the text of this draft constitution bears the mark of 
cumbersome compromises. As a result the provisions the AFSJ – especially in Part III of the 
draft – have become even less legible and transparent than the in this respect much 
maligned provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Yes, the “pillars” have been formally 
abolished, but a number of special decision-making rules lend them a sort of “ghostly” after-
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life which overshadows and blurs the unity of the AFSJ. More general provisions in one 
paragraph are in many cases made subject to detailed special rules which partially restrict or 
change the meaning of the more general provision or obscure the general rationale of Union 
action in the respective field. The misleading use of the term “common policy” in the 
immigration field and the extraordinarily complex provisions on judicial co-operation in 
criminal matters in Articles III-171 and 172 are striking examples in this respect. At least as 
regards the provisions on JHA co-operation the Convention has clearly failed to simplify 
current treaty provisions and to make them more transparent, which was, after all, an 
important part  of its mandate. After the adding of the protocols which the Convention has not 
dealt with (on the British, Irish and Danish opt-outs, for instance) the corpus of provisions on 
AFSJ will appear  at least as complex and impenetrable as before. 
 Although the creation of a single legal framework and the incorporation of the Charter 
can be regarded as important elements of “constitutional progress” the above mentioned 
flaws  
make the Convention’s draft look more like the result of an “ordinary” treaty reforming IGC 
with all its complex compromises and incremental elements of progress. If parts of the JHA 
provisions are amended by the IGC – which is a distinct possibility – it will become even 
clearer that the legal framework of the AFSJ will continue to be an international treaty agreed 
on by national governments and not a “constitution”.  
Should the draft constitution’s compromise package be “opened up” by the IGC? 
Such a step is most unlikely to add any “constitutional” value to the AFSJ. While there may 
be some scope for individual improvements there is also a huge risk of a negotiation on the 
actual provisions generating a stream of changes driven by specific national interests which 
could easily undermine the progressive elements in the draft and even the AFSJ itself. Those 
intent on amending the Convention’s text would do well to remember the story of Pandora’s 
box.   
The results of the seventeen months of deliberations of the European Convention in 
the area of JHA co-operation are clearly far from perfect. Yet should the IGC adopt them 
without change they could still be regarded as substantial and innovative enough to justify 
the term of  “new framework” for what clearly is one of the most important political projects of 
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